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GAME CHANGER? PROFESSIONAL 
SPORT AND DANGEROUS 
RECREATIONAL ACTIVITY: REVISITING 
THE RULING IN DODGE V SNELL
David Thorpe*
Leanne Houston**
This article examines whether professional athletes are liable for 
injury to opponents when engaged in ‘dangerous recreational 
activity’ under state civil liability legislation. It reviews two 
apparently conflicting Supreme Court judgments and concludes that 
the resolution of the distinctions in this important area may depend 
upon appeal to a higher court.
Introduction
Professional athletes and their sporting organisations may have thought 
themselves immune from claims of negligently harming an opponent in a sport 
classifiable	 as	 a	 ‘dangerous	 recreational	 activity’	 under	 state	 civil	 liability	
legislation. The relief this legislation might have provided to tortfeasors was 
placed in doubt when, in 2011, Wood J of the Supreme Court of Tasmania in 
Dodge v Snell1 found that the word ‘recreational’ did not apply to professional 
sport. In consequence, those who negligently harmed another in that context 
remained, ceteris paribus, exposed to civil liability.
The ruling of Wood J was itself under challenge when, in 2016 in Goode v 
Angland,2	Harrison	J,	making	specific	reference	to	Dodge v Snell, determined 
that the dangerous recreational activity provisions of the Civil Liability Act 
(NSW) did apply to professional athletes. 
Both Dodge v Snell and Goode v Angland concerned professional jockeys 
injured when their mounts fell to the track during race meetings in Tasmania 
and New South Wales respectively. Two Supreme Court judgments in 
different	 states,	 applying	 identical	 provisions	 to	 similar	 facts,	 delivered	 two	
incompatible	 judgments,	 leading	 to	 uncertainty	 for	 legal	 advisers,	 officials	
and athletes themselves. The reasoning of each judgment in respect to the 
dangerous recreational provisions is so fundamentally at odds that there can be 
no reconciliation. 
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On one level the ruling in Dodge was a welcome exception to legislation that 
appeared counter-intuitive; where the greater the danger, the less care a potential 
tortfeasor was required to take. Consequently, where the risk of serious injury 
is obvious to a person in the position of a potential victim, the victim bears the 
entire	cost	of	the	tortfeasor’s	negligence	removing	any	financial	incentive	for	
the tortfeasor to take reasonable care. The consequence of Goode v Angland, 
should it, or a like case be upheld on appeal, is to again protect the negligent 
professional athlete from the consequences of his or her conduct. On a practical 
level,	Mr	Dodge	 suffered	a	number	of	 injuries,	 including	a	non-catastrophic	
injury	 to	 the	neck,	and	was	awarded	$772	895;	whereas,	Mr	Goode	suffered	
a	 catastrophic	neck	 injury	 confining	him	 to	 a	wheelchair.	 It	 is	 reasonable	 to	
believe that in the decision to bring his case Mr Goode would have relied on the 
finding	in	Dodge v Snell. Liability did not, however, attach to the defendant, as 
Harrison J found Mr Goode’s injuries were the ‘result of the materialisation of 
an obvious risk of a dangerous recreational activity’.3 
This article examines the legal and factual basis of the rulings in Dodge v 
Snell and Goode v Angland and considers the application of the dangerous 
recreational activity provisions. The article also considers in light of Goode, 
the potential application of the Dodge v Snell decision on forms of employment 
where sport is a mandated or encouraged activity. 
Dangerous Recreational Activity Immunity
Under state civil liability legislation, a person is not liable for negligent harm 
resulting from the materialisation of an obvious risk of a ‘dangerous recreational 
activity’ engaged in by the victim.4 For example, section 20 of the Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (Tas) provides: 
(1)  A person [the defendant] is not liable for a breach of duty of 
harm	 suffered	 by	 another	 person	 (‘the	 plaintiff’)	 as	 a	 result	




Section	19	of	the	Civil Liability Act 2002	(Tas)	defines	‘dangerous	recreational	
activity’ and ‘recreational activity, as follows: 
dangerous recreational activity means a recreational activity that 
involves	a	significant	risk	of	physical	harm;
3 Ibid [146]. It can be noted that Harrison J in Goode, although discussing the dangerous recreational activity 
provisions, found that the defendant Angland had not engaged in negligent conduct: at [130].
4 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) ss 5F, 5K–5L; Civil Liability Act 2003	(Qld)	ss	13–14,	17–19;	Civil Liability 
Act 1936 (SA) ss 36–7; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) ss 15–16, 20; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) ss 53–4; Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (WA) ss 5F–5H.
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…
recreational activity includes –
 (a)  any sport (whether or not the sport is an organised activity); 
and
 (b)  any pursuit or activity engaged in for enjoyment, relaxation 
or leisure.
‘Obvious	risk’	is	defined	in	section	15	of	the	Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), as 
follows: 
(1)	 	…	an	‘obvious	risk’	to	a	person	who	suffers	harm	is	a	risk	that,	
in the circumstances, would have been obvious to a reasonable 
person in the position of that person.
(2)  Obvious risks include risks that are patent or a matter of 
common knowledge.
The	word	‘obvious’	is	not	defined	in	any	of	the	civil	liability	legislation,	although	
it has been found and accepted to mean: ‘that both the condition and the risk are 
apparent to and would be recognised by a reasonable man, in the position of the 
[plaintiff],	exercising	ordinary	perception,	intelligence	and	judgment.’5
Accordingly, an athlete tortfeasor seeking to avoid damages following his or 
her negligent conduct will accept responsibility but claim that as the harm was 
caused by the materialisation of an obvious risk of the dangerous recreational 
activity, he or she cannot be liable in law. 
The DRA provisions, along with broad tort law reform, arose from the so-called 
‘insurance crises’ of the early 2000s. Premier of New South Wales, Bob Carr, 
announced steps to ‘restore sense and balance in the law of negligence’.6 A 
‘Panel of Eminent Persons’, the ‘Ipp Committee’, chaired by Justice David 
Ipp, was formed by the federal and state governments in 2002 to undertake a 
‘Principles-based Review of the Law of Negligence’, and tasked to ‘examine a 
method for the reform of the common law with the objective of limiting liability 
and quantum of damages arising from personal death and injury.’7 As discussed 
further below, according to Ipp JA, the exemption is based on the notion that 
‘a	plaintiff	who	engages	in	a	dangerous	recreational	activity	in	circumstances	
where the risks are obvious is to be regarded as having assumed those risks’.8 
The	provision	therefore	offers	to	a	tortfeasor	a	complete	defence	to	a	finding	
of negligence.9
5 Wyong Shire Council v Vairy; Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council	(2004)	Aust	Torts	Reports	¶81-754,	65	
892	at	[161]	(Tobias	JA).
6 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 May 2002, 1764.
7 David Ipp et al, ‘Review of the Law of Negligence Final Report’ (Report, September 2002) ix (‘Final 
Report’).
8 Fallas v Mourlas (2006) 65 NSWLR 418, 426 [45], citing ibid 65–67 [4.20]–[4.24].
9 Final Report, above n 7, 65–6 [4.20]. For further discussion of state civil liability legislation as it applies to 
sport and recreation see David Thorpe, et al, Sports Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2013) ch 5.
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The Decision in Dodge v Snell
Mr Dodge, an experienced professional jockey, was forced to retire after being 
severely injured in a fall at the Elswick Racecourse in Tasmania. Mr Dodge’s 
horse, Oceano, fell following a series of events which began when the defendant 
jockey, Mr Snell, in breach of a ‘two-lengths policy’, moved towards the rails 
into the path of two other horses ridden by jockeys Mr McCoull and Mr Bandy, 
compressing	 the	 field.	One	 of	 these	 horses,	 Colonel	 Parker,	 shifted	 in	 front	
of Tal Jack. Both horses clipped hooves. Tal Jack fell onto the track. Oceano 
tripped over the stricken Tal Jack, catapulting Mr Dodge onto the track, and 
then landed on top of Mr Dodge. Evidence was given by Mr McCoull and Mr 
Bandy that they had called out to Snell warning him not to cross over. 
To avoid breaching careless riding rules or interfering with the running of other 
horses a jockey is not permitted to move his or her horse into the path of another 
horse unless there are at least two horse lengths of space available in which to 
slot.10 The rule takes into account that galloping horses extend their rear hooves 
backward beyond their rump, and their front legs forward from their shoulders.
Mr Dodge claimed Mr Snell was negligent in failing to keep a proper look out 
and in breaching the two-lengths policy. Mr Snell disputed Mr Dodge’s claim 
on the basis that he did not breach his duty of care and, in the alternative, should 
it be found he had breached his duty he was not liable under the dangerous 
recreational activity provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas).11
A stewards’ inquiry found that Snell had breached rule 137 of the Australian 
Rules of Racing by engaging in ‘careless riding’, the least serious charge that 
can be brought under that rule, which states: ‘[a]ny rider may be punished if, 
in the opinion of the Stewards, … he is guilty of careless, reckless, improper, 
incompetent or foul riding’.12 However, Woods J noted that the Steward’s 
finding	‘does	not	assist	the	plaintiff	in	proving	that	the	defendant	was	negligent.	
It	 is	no	more	 than	a	finding	by	a	 tribunal	on	 the	evidence	before	 it,	 that	 the	
defendant breached a rule of racing.’13
Justice Wood found that ‘[j]ockeys owe a duty of care to their fellow jockeys to 
take reasonable care to avoid creating a foreseeable risk of injury’.14 Mr Snell 
had breached this duty by shifting in and exposing Mr Dodge and the jockeys 
riding	on	his	inside,	to	a	foreseeable	and	‘not	insignificant’	risk	of	injury	because
10 The ‘two-lengths policy’ was described in Dodge v Snell	[2011]	TASSC	19,	[36]	as:	
 the length of a horse standing still from the tip of its nose to its tail, about eight feet or 2.4 metres, and 
another	length	of	daylight,	so	‘2.4	metres	times	two’.	Mr	Gleeson	went	on	to	note	that	the	definition	is	
clear	and	people	who	are	involved	in	racing	do	not	have	any	difficulty	in	interpreting	the	two	lengths	
policy during the running of a race.
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[i]n the circumstances that existed, including the number of horses 
racing in a tight bunch, there was a clear prospect that another 
horse	or	horses	would	be	adversely	affected	if	Mr	McCoull’s	horse	
lost its rightful running. There was the risk that one of the horses 
affected	by	the	manoeuvre	would	clip	hooves	with	another	horse.	
As a consequence of Mr Snell’s actions of shifting inwards, with 
a clearance of no more than one and a quarter lengths, there was 
an obvious risk of a jockey falling and serious injuries resulting. 
Clearly,	the	fall	and	injuries	of	the	type	suffered	by	Mr	Dodge	were	
foreseeable. It was a risk of harm of which Mr Snell was both well 
aware, and of which he ought reasonably to have known.15
Although in breach of his duty of care to Mr Dodge, the defence of ‘dangerous 
recreational activity’ was argued by Mr Snell to relieve him of liability. Justice 
Wood determined that, ‘there can be no question that the activity of horse racing 
qualifies	 as	 dangerous	 and	 satisfies	 the	 test	 in	 the	Act	 of	 “a	 significant	 risk	
of physical harm to a person”.’16 The gravamen, however, was whether horse 
riding,	as	a	professional	sport,	was	to	be	classified	as	a	‘recreational	activity’.17 
Section 20 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) requires that the activity the 
plaintiff	is	engaged	in	at	the	time	of	suffering	harm	be	a	‘recreational	activity’,	as	
defined	in	section	19.	Justice	Wood	found	that	the	word	‘recreational’	does	‘not	
extend to activities carried out in the course of employment or occupation.’18 
The rationale and methodology by which Wood J reached this conclusion is 
discussed	below	in	conjunction	with	the	relevant	findings	in	Goode v Angland. 
The Decision in Goode v Angland
On	29	June	2009,	at	the	Queanbeyan	Race	Course	the	plaintiff,	Mr	Paul	Leslie	
Goode, an English jockey, sustained a catastrophic injury resulting in paraplegia 
after a race fall. Mr Goode claimed that his injuries were caused by jockey Tye 
Angland’s negligence, who is said to have breached his duty of care by riding 
in such a manner as to cause interference to him and his mount Shot of the 
Rails. He contended that the breach was due to Mr Angland’s alleged steering 
inwards across his clear and rightful line on his mount Port Gallery, which was 
contrary to the ‘two lengths’ rule.19 Mr Goode asserted that Shot of Rails’ front 
legs clipped the heels of Port Gallery as it moved across. Mr Angland denied 
liability and submitted to the court that the ‘two lengths’ rule was no more than 
a guideline to which strict adherence was not required. The ‘two lengths’ rule 
being the position that no rider is permitted to shift or veer in front of another 





19 Racing Australia, Australian Rules of Racing	 (at	1	May	2009)	 r	136(1)	provides:	 ‘[i]f	a	horse	…	crosses	
another	horse	so	as	to	interfere	with	that,	or	any	other	horse	…	such	horse	…	may	be	disqualified	from	the	race.’
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by a distance of two lengths or some greater distance. He further argued that Mr 
Goode had to prove that Port Gallery moved an unreasonable distance laterally 
and in such a manner as to deprive him of a reasonable opportunity to adjust 
Shot of the Rails’ position in response. 
Justice Harrison concluded that Mr Angland was not negligent and did not 
breach his duty to Mr Goode. After careful and thorough review of the video 
evidence, his Honour concluded that the fall was caused by Mr Goode’s horse 
running uncontrolled into the rear of Port Gallery, which resulted in the animals’ 
legs coming into contact. Further, Harrison J found that Mr Goode was not in 
total control of his horse due to his horse ‘over racing’ immediately before the 
fall.20
Although	 finding	 Mr	 Angland	 was	 not	 negligent,	 Harrison	 J	 nonetheless	
addressed the argument that Mr Goode had been injured from the materialisation 
of an obvious risk of a dangerous recreational activity. His Honour found that 
the harm which befell Mr Goode was an ‘obvious risk’ of riding in a horse 
race. However, in contradistinction to the decision of Wood J in Dodge v Snell, 
Harrison J found that horse racing fell within the meaning of ‘sport’, stating:
Sport	can	be	defined	as	an	activity	involving	physical	exertion	and	
skill in which an individual or team competes against another or 
others for entertainment or enjoyment and/or as a job. Horseracing 
is sometimes described as the sport of kings. I am unaware of any 
definition	 of	 sport	 that	 limits	 it	 to	 purely	 recreational	 or	 leisure	
activities or that excludes professional sport. 21
Because the harm caused to Mr Goode was the result of a materialisation of an 
obvious risk of a dangerous recreational activity, section 5L of the Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (NSW) would have served to ‘exclude Mr Angland’s liability’.22
The Methodologies of Interpretation
Matters of Contention
The decisions of Harrison J in Goode v Angland and Wood J in Dodge v Snell are 
at odds in respect to the application of the legislation to ‘recreational activity’. 
In	 essence	whether	 professional	 sport	 is	 to	 be	 included	 under	 the	 definition	
of ‘recreational activity. Given the identical wording of the legislation, both 
cannot be correct. 
Justice Harrison in referring to the decision of Wood J stated 
20 Goode v Angland [2016] NSWSC 1014, [117]–[130].
21 Ibid [145].
22 Ibid [146].
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[I]n Dodge v Snell the Court concluded that ‘recreational activity’ 
did not include professional sports. That conclusion was arrived at 
notwithstanding	that	the	definition	of	recreational	activity	expressly	
includes ‘any sport’ ... To the extent that it is necessary for me to 
do so, I respectfully disagree with the Tasmanian decision: having 
regard to their ordinary meaning, the words in the equivalent New 
South Wales provision do not permit of such a conclusion.23
As noted above, Wood J found that Mr Dodge, as a professional jockey carrying 
out his occupation, ‘was not engaged in a recreational activity. The exclusion 
in s20, does not apply.’24
General Principles of Interpretation 
Important to the present discussion, Wood J in Dodge v Snell noted an absence 
of precedent and juridical discussion regarding ‘recreational activity’, stating, 
‘I have not been referred to, or located in my research, any decisions from other 
jurisdictions which have examined the meaning of “recreational activity” in the 
context of a dispute about whether the activity engaged in was recreational in 
nature.’25 There is, then, little guidance other than the words of the provision 
itself and the principles of statutory interpretation.
The process of statutory interpretation necessitates a base appreciation that, ‘[t]
he Act means what it says, and, what is more important, it does not mean what 
it does not say.’26 
Construing the meaning of statutory words, however, has been described as 
a matter of initial inquiry only such that, ‘the natural and ordinary meaning 
of what is actually said in the Act must be the starting point.’ One must then 
consider the adjuration to give to words ‘the meaning that the legislature 
intended them to have.’27 
In construing parliamentary intention there is a line to be drawn, at least as a 
first	step	in	interpretation,	between	the	words	of	the	legislation	itself	and	what	
individuals may say in regard to the legislation: ‘legislation must be construed 
by reference to what Parliament has said through its enactment, as distinct from 
what others, including ministers, may wish or think Parliament intended. … 
the	duty	of	courts	 is	 to	give	effect	 to	 that	 intention,	but	only	as	expressed	in	
legislation.’28
23 Ibid [137] (citations omitted).
24 Dodge v Snell	[2011]	TASSC	19,	[278].
25 Ibid [244].
26 Secretary of Department of Health v Harvey	(1990)	21	ALD	393,	393	(Meagher	JA).
27 Lacey v Attorney-General (Qld)	(2011)	242	CLR	573,	591–2	[43]	(French	CJ,	Gummow,	Hayne,	Crennan,	
Kiefel and Bell JJ).
28 Harrison v Melhem	(2008)	72	NSWLR	380,	398–9	[159]–[160]	(Mason	P).
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In Alcan (NT) Alumina v Commissioner of Territory Revenue, French CJ 
restated, in line with traditional approaches, that
the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration 
of the text itself. Historical considerations and extrinsic materials 
cannot be relied on to displace the clear meaning of the text. …
The meaning of the text may require consideration of the context, 
which includes the general purpose and policy of the provision, in 
particular the mischief it is seeking to remedy.29
The Interpretative Process in Dodge v Snell
Justice Wood found, ‘[o]n the evidence before me there can be no question that 
the	activity	of	horse	racing	qualifies	as	dangerous	and	satisfies	the	test	in	the	Act	
of	“a	significant	risk	of	physical	harm”’	to	a	person.30 Nonetheless, although the 
activity was ‘dangerous’, the provision also requires that the danger be incurred 
whilst	the	plaintiff	was	engaged	in	a	‘recreational	activity’.	The	question	before	
Wood J was whether professional sport was a ‘recreational activity’ for the 
purposes of the Act.
The	plaintiff,	Mr	Dodge,	submitted	that	the	provisions	of	the	Civil Liability Act 
2002 (Tas) relieving a tortfeasor of liability were not intended to include people 
who participate in ‘recreational activities’ in the course of their employment. 
In other words, as the jockeys were engaged in the activity of professional 
horse riding, the defendant is not to be relieved of liability for the harm caused 
through his act of negligence.31 The defendant, Mr Snell, argued that it would be 
incongruous for a division to be made between professional or amateur ‘sport’ 
such that he was protected from liability because Mr Dodge was engaged in a 
dangerous ‘recreational’ activity.32 
Justice	Wood	proposed	several	reasons	to	support	his	view	that	section	19	did	
not	apply	to	professional	employment	in	sport:	first,	the	natural	meaning	of	the	
words within their context; secondly, the purpose of the legislation supported 
such a construction; thirdly, the consequences visited on those employed in 
sport if such a construction was not adopted; and fourthly; the support of such 
a construction by extrinsic material. 
Justice Wood reasoned that while it was clear that Parliament intended ‘any 
sport’	 to	 fall	 within	 the	 definition	 of	 recreational	 activity,	 the	 natural	 and	
ordinary	meaning	of	section	19	is	informed	by	the	word	‘recreational’:	‘[w]hen	
the provision is read as a whole it is apparent that the word “recreational” has 
a role in identifying and conveying the reach of the provision and the activities 
29	 (2009)	238	CLR	27,	46	[47].
30 Dodge v Snell	[2011]	TASSC	19,	[242].
31 See ibid [248].
32 Ibid [246].
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that fall within the provision. The ‘word “recreational” imparts meaning to the 
word “sport”.’33 
Her Honour looked to the Oxford and Macquarie dictionaries to discern the 
meaning	of	the	word	‘recreational’.	Several	meanings	were	offered	including	
‘by some pleasant occupation, pastime or amusement … An instance of this; 
a pleasurable exercise or employment’ and ‘refreshment by means of some 
pastime, agreeable exercise, … a pastime, diversion … or other resource 
affording	 relation	 and	 enjoyment.’34 In this context, Wood J found a base 
supporting the opinion that the dangerous recreational activity provisions did 
not apply to professional sport, stating, ‘[r]ecreational activity is the antithesis 
of paid employment, and perhaps also toil and unremunerated labour. Duties 
such as housework or charity work would also … be excluded from the ordinary 
meaning of “recreational activity”.35
According to her Honour the word ‘recreational’ determines the scope of all 
activities	listed	within	section	19,	be	they	‘any	sport’,	‘any	pursuit	or	activity	
engaged in for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure’ or ‘any pursuit or activity 
engaged in at a place … where people ordinarily engage in sport or in any 
pursuit or activity for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure.’ As Wood J stated, 
The	 word	 ‘recreational’	 is	 over-arching	 in	 its	 effect,	 and	 the	
purpose of the provision is to assist with the ambit of the phrase 
and the nature of activities covered by the provision within the 
parameter of being recreational in nature. The provision conveys 
a wide reach extending to any sport and, indeed, any other activity 
providing it is for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure. However, it is a 
given requirement that the activity must be “recreational” and the 
provision is designed to assist with the breadth of activities that are 
captured by the phrase.36 
…
When	 effect	 is	 given	 to	 the	word	 ‘recreational’,	 the	 ambit	 of	 the	
provision coincides with the ordinary meaning of “recreational 
activities”. In considering the provision I can see no indication that 
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The Use of Extrinsic Material
Justice Wood determined that as the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) did not 
intrude into claims of negligence in employment, there was no indication that 
Parliament	intended	section	19	to	operate	as	an	exception.	Her	Honour	stated:	
The context of the provision and a consideration of the Act as a 
whole does not suggest that the exclusion regarding “dangerous 
recreational activities” was intended to extend to professional 
sportspeople carrying out their paid occupations. … The Act as a 
whole indicates an intention to avoid incursions into civil liability 
arising from employment (see s3B excluding civil liability against 
employers relating to personal injury).38
Her Honour found that Parliament could not have meant the Act to have the 
‘far-reaching’ consequence of precluding an injured party claiming relief from 
a ‘fellow sportsman’ or ‘their employer or others owing them a duty of care’.39 
Justice Wood further relied upon the Final Report in respect of what it said 
about ‘voluntary’ participation in recreational activity and how that likely 
informed the intention of Parliament:
4.11  The Panel is of the view, however, that a principled reason can 
be given for treating recreational activities and recreational 
services as a special category for the purposes of personal 
injury law, regardless of whether the provider of the service is 
an	NPO	or	a	for-profit	organisation.	The	reason	is	that	people	
who participate in such activities often do so voluntarily and 
wholly or predominantly for self-regarding reasons.
4.12  This is not always the case, of course. Members of schools 
and other institutions may be required to engage in sporting 
and other recreational activities. Also, people who participate 
in recreational activities in the course of their employment do 
not do so voluntarily in the relevant sense. The rationale for 
treating recreational services and activities as a special case 
does not apply to such persons. Therefore, any rule limiting 
liability in respect of recreational services should not apply to 
them.40
To	 support	 the	 inference	 that	 those	 parts	 of	 the	 Final	Report	 influenced	 the	
intention of Parliament, Wood J made reference to the second reading speech of 
38 Ibid [270].
39 Ibid [272].
40 Ibid [274] (emphasis added).
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the Civil Liability Amendment Bill 2003 (Tas), which reinforced the notion that 
‘recreation’	should	be	confined	to	‘voluntary’	recreational	activity	as	opposed	
to ‘employment’:
The third category of reforms are those which emphasise the 
concept of personal responsibility and the need for each person 
to accept responsibility for his or her own actions, without always 
looking	for	someone	else	to	blame	for	any	misfortune	suffered.	This	
is particularly so in relation to recreational activities which a person 
voluntarily undertakes for their personal enjoyment.41
The word ‘voluntary’ is not written into the dangerous recreational activity 
provisions. Her Honour nonetheless formed the view that the second reading 
speech, ‘reveals an intention to limit the activities to activities that are 
recreational, and presumably the voluntary nature of those activities was seen 
as	implicit	in	the	definition	as	drafted.’42 
As	 Wood	 J	 had	 stated	 earlier	 in	 the	 judgment,	 the	 ‘CL	 Act,	 s19,	 is	 not	
ambiguous’.43 Her Honour’s reference to the Final Report and the second 
reading speech, both of which are extrinsic material, rely, apparently, on section 
8B (1)(c) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1931 (Tas), which provides:
(1)  Subject to subsection (2), in the interpretation of a provision 
of an Act, consideration may be given to extrinsic material 
capable of assisting in the interpretation – 
  (a)  if the provision is ambiguous or obscure, to provide an 
interpretation of it; or 
  (b)  if the ordinary meaning of the provision leads to a result 
that is manifestly absurd or is unreasonable, to provide 
an interpretation that avoids such a result; or 
	 	 (c)	 	in	any	other	case,	to	confirm	the	interpretation	conveyed	
by the ordinary meaning of the provision. 
Although not referred to directly in her Honour’s judgment, section 8B(1)(c) 
permits	referral	to	extrinsic	material	to	confirm	whether	the	‘ordinary	meaning’	
of	a	word	or	provision,	 in	 this	case	section	19,	aligns	with	 the	court’s	 initial	
denotation. Clearly there is no need for ambiguity or absurdity.
The modern approach to statutory interpretation as considered in CIC Insurance 
Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd44 implies that no limit is placed at common 
law on the kinds of extrinsic material to which reference may be made, although 
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there are limits on the use that may be made of it. That case was taken as 
resolving the position that, at common law, reference to extrinsic material is 
permissible	at	first	instance	without	identifying	an	ambiguity.	This	is,	however,	
in	 conflict	 with	 Saaed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship,45 where 
French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ said: ‘it is erroneous to 
look at extrinsic materials before exhausting the application of the ordinary 
rules of statutory construction.’ The position, therefore, does remain uncertain.46 
In a later decision, Kiefel J observed relevantly that 
It is legitimate to resort to materials outside the statute, but it is 
necessary to bear in mind the purpose of doing so and the process 
of construction to which it is directed. That purpose is, generally 
speaking, to identify the policy of the statute in order to better 
understand the language and intended operation of the statute.47
Much of course rests on whether the meaning of ‘recreational’ as proposed by 
Wood J, accords with the ‘ordinary meaning’ of that word. It is arguable that it 
does not.
In Sherritt Gordon Mines Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation, McInerney J 
considered the application of ‘includes’ in the passage: ‘“Business” includes 
a profession, trade, employment, vocation or calling, but does not include 
occupation as an employee.’ Justice McInerney took the view that the use of 
‘includes’	expands	the	meaning	of	the	definition	beyond	the	ordinary	meaning,	
stating,	‘[i]n	such	case,	the	definition	adds	the	meanings	given	in	the	definition	
clause to the natural meaning of the word. The added meaning is often one not 
otherwise within the natural meaning, so that the natural meaning of the word 
is	to	that	extent	amplified.’48
According to Pearce and Geddes the ‘intention’ of the use of the word ‘includes’ 
when	used	 in	a	definitional	provision	 is	 to	 ‘enlarge	 the	ordinary	meaning	of	
the word’.49	In	this	sense	the	word	to	be	defined	retains	its	ordinary	meaning,	
in	addition	to	the	meaning	as	defined	in	the	statute.	The	application	serves	to	
support the analysis of Wood J in that ‘sport’ within the provision is referenced 
to the natural meaning of ‘recreation’. 
Nonetheless, the assumption is not conclusive and doubt may be expressed as 
to whether the legislature intended the words ‘any sport’ to exclude sport as 
a profession. To illustrate, in Dilworth v Commissioner of Stamps, the Privy 
45 (2010) 241 CLR 252, 265 [33].
46 See, eg, Justice Susan Kenny, ‘Current Issues in the Interpretation of Federal Legislation’ (Speech delivered 
at the National Commercial Law Seminar Series, Melbourne, 3 September 2013); Justice Nye Perram, ‘Context 
and	Complexity:	Some	Reflections	by	a	New	Judge’	(Speech	delivered	at	Challis	Taxation	Discussion	Group,	
Sydney, 6 August 2010).
47 Certain Lloyd’s Underwriters v Cross (2012)	248	CLR	378,	412	[89].
48 Sherrit Gordon Mines Ltd v FCT [1977]	VR	342,	353.	
49 D C Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 7th ed, 2011) 248 
[6.61].
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Council had to determine whether the expression ‘charitable devise or bequest’ 
possessed an exhaustive meaning or a meaning that was expanded beyond the 
ordinary meaning. Lord Watson stated:
But the word ‘include’ is susceptible of another construction, which 
may	become	 imperative,	 if	 the	 context	 of	 the	Act	 is	 sufficient	 to	
shew that it was not merely employed for the purpose of adding to 
the	natural	significance	of	the	words	or	expressions	defined.	It	may	
be	equivalent	to	‘mean	and	include’,	and	in	that	case	it	may	afford	
an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of 
the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions.50
Using	 this	 characterisation,	 the	 words	 ‘recreational	 activity’	 are	 defined	 by	
the words listed within the subsections, including ‘any sport’. ‘Sport’ in this 
sense would take on an ‘exhaustive meaning’. While ‘recreational activity’ 
may include activities additional to those listed in the subsections, it is, for the 
purposes	of	 the	provision,	a	definition	 that	 identifies	‘sport’	as	a	recreational	
activity. As such, an additional meaning to be given to the word ‘recreational’ 
does not impact upon, or restrict, the meaning of ‘sport’. Justice Wood has, by 
looking to the general meaning of ‘recreational’, narrowed the application of 
‘any sport’ within the subsection to exclude professional sport. While it is true 
that professional sport may not be a recreation, it does not necessarily follow, 
given	the	task	of	the	subsection	is	to	give	definition	to	the	word	‘recreational’	
for the purposes of the provision, that ‘sport’, as a professional undertaking, 
should necessarily be excluded. 
As applied by Wood J, the meaning of the word ‘recreational’ is informed 
by the meaning of the word in general usage in addition to the words of the 
provision. In summary, Wood J found that the ‘word “recreational” imparts 
meaning to the word “sport”.’51	Although	the	definition	of	‘recreational’	is	not	
exhaustive, as indicated by the use of the word ‘includes’, the word ‘sport’ is 
of clear denotation.
The Interpretative Process in Goode v Angland
Justice Harrison began his assessment of the ‘dangerous recreational activity’ 
provisions52 by stating:
In Dodge v Snell the Court concluded that ‘recreational activity’ 
did not include professional sports. That conclusion was arrived at 
notwithstanding	that	the	definition	of	recreational	activity	expressly	
50 Dilworth v Commissioner of Stamps	[1899]	AC	99,	106.
51 Dodge v Snell	[2011]	TASSC	19,	[261].
52 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5K, concerns ‘recreational activity’ and has the equivalent wording of s 
19	of	the	Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas). Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) s 5L, concerns ‘dangerous recreational 
activity’ and has the equivalent wording of s 20 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas).
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includes ‘any sport’ … To the extent that it is necessary for me to 
do so, I respectfully disagree with the Tasmanian decision: having 
regard to their ordinary meaning, the words in the equivalent New 
South Wales provision do not permit of such a conclusion.53
Justice Harrison in considering the semantic basis to the question nonetheless 
gave recognition to the alternate proposition stating:
It	is	difficult	to	see	how	a	professional	activity,	sporting	or	otherwise,	
can be considered to be something engaged in for enjoyment, 
relaxation or leisure. That is Mr Goode’s point. By the same token, 
it	is	also	difficult	to	see	how	the	ordinary	meaning	of	the	words	‘any	
sport’ does not include professional sport. … That is Mr Angland’s 
point.54
Although identifying the apparent contradiction in classifying a profession as 
recreation,	 his	Honour	 found	 the	 expression	 ‘any	 sport’	 to	 be	 definitive	 and	
consequently accorded it paramountcy over ‘recreational’: 
For better or worse, once it is accepted that horseracing is a sport 
… s	 5K(a)	 of	 the	Act	 seems	 to	 be	 unanswerable.	 The	 definition
of recreational activity in a way that includes “any sport” leaves 
no room for an argument that relevantly enlivens the distinction 
between sport that is undertaken or pursued for enjoyment, 
relaxation or leisure and sport that is undertaken or pursued as a 
profession or occupation.55
In arriving at that determination, a point of some interpretive importance was 
that	 section	 5K,	 ‘Definitions’,	 of	 the	 Civil	 Liability	Act	 2002	 (NSW),	 the	
equivalent	to	section	19	of	the	Civil	Liability	Act	2002	(Tas),	defined	‘dangerous	
recreational activity’ and ‘recreational activity’ separately. For convenience, 
section 5K of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), is reproduced:
In this Division: 




(a)  any sport (whether or not the sport is an organised activity), and
53 Goode v Angland [2016] NSWSC 1014, [137].
54 Ibid [143].
55 Ibid [144]. As an aside worth noting, Harrison J stated that while the characterisation of horse racing as a sport 
was	not	argued	before	him,	it	was	a	‘matter	about	which	minds	might	legitimately	differ’:	at	[144].	His	Honour	
later	stated,	‘[h]orseracing	is	sometimes	described	as	the	sport	of	kings.	I	am	unaware	of	any	definition	of	sport	
that limits it to purely recreational activities or that excludes professional sport’: at [145].
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(b)  any pursuit or activity engaged in for enjoyment, relaxation or 
leisure, and
(c)  any pursuit or activity engaged in at a place (such as a beach, 
park or other public open space) where people ordinarily 
engage in sport or in any pursuit or activity for enjoyment, 
relaxation or leisure.
As his Honour stated, it is ‘at least clear, if it were not otherwise, from the fact that 
both “dangerous recreational activity” and “recreational activity” are separately 
defined	 in	 the	Act.’56	One	would	assume,	given	 the	separate	definitions,	 that	
once	a	recreational	activity	involved	‘a	significant	risk	of	physical	harm’,	the	
analysis need move no further. A recreational activity includes ‘sport’. A sport 
that is dangerous relieves the tortfeasor of liability. Horse racing is a sport that 
is dangerous. 
The	 application,	 however,	 is	 not	 definitive	 as,	 assuming	 that	 ‘recreational	
activity’	 as	 used	 in	 the	 definition	 of	 ‘dangerous	 recreational	 activity’	 has	 a	
common meaning with ‘recreational activity’ in subparagraph (a) of s5K, the 
argument	raised	in	Dodge	v	Snell,	 that	 the	word	being	defined	(recreational)	
continues to carry its ordinary meaning, remains alive. That is, only a sport that 
is ‘recreational’ can have the epithet ‘dangerous’ attached to it.
Goode	offered	 two	cases	where	 ‘recreational	activity’	was	defined	according	
to characteristics of ‘enjoyment, relaxation or leisure’. In Belna Pty Ltd t/a 
Fernwood Fitness Centre Parramatta v Irwin, exercise in a gym to lose weight 
was	a	recreational	activity	because	the	plaintiff	in	those	proceedings	described	
her goal for undertaking the program was to ‘enjoy life’.57 In Motorcycling 
Events Group Australia Pty Ltd v Kelly, the argument that ‘teaching motorcycling 
skills was a serious business and that such instruction was not a recreational 
activity’ was rejected on the basis that the respondent’s goal in participating 
was for ‘enjoyment’.58 Although these cases emphasised ‘enjoyment’, it did not 
necessarily follow that sport may involve characteristics that did not include 
enjoyment. Justice Harrison commented that, 
it	is	…	difficult	to	see	how	the	ordinary	meaning	of	the	words	‘any	
sport’ does not include professional sport. Indeed, the reference 
to ‘any sport’ in s 5K(a) is unique in that it does not contain any 
reference to the words enjoyment, relaxation or leisure that is 
contained in s 5K(b) and (c).’59
Given the certainty of his Honour’s judgment and a commensurate absence 
of ambiguity, no recourse, presumably, could be made to extrinsic materials. 
56	 Ibid	[139].
57	 [2009]	NSWCA	46,	[14]	(Ipp	JA).
58 Motorcycling Events Group Australia Pty Ltd v Kelly (2013) 86 NSWLR 55, 80 [100]–[105] (Gleeson JA).
59 Goode v Angland [2016] NSWSC 1014, [143].
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As noted above, the second reading speech in respect to the Civil Liability 
Act	2002	 (Tas)	provided	an	 additional	 reason	 for	Wood	 J	 to	find	 the	 statute	
was directed to ‘voluntary’ activities, rather than professional employment. The 
second	reading	speech	of	the	NSW	statute	offered	little	to	clarify	the	meaning	
of ‘recreational activity’, stating merely, ‘[n]or will there be any liability for the 
obvious risks of particularly dangerous sports and other risky activities.’60 There 
were no references to the ‘voluntary’ engagement in ‘dangerous recreational 
activity’.
Appellate Court Determinations
The judgments in Dodge v Snell and Goode vAngland were made by single 
judges of the Supreme Courts of Tasmania and New South Wales respectively. 
It is, of course, desirable that uniformity of interpretation apply across the 
jurisdictions of Australia where statutes designed to achieve similar objects are 
expressed in very similar terms. Should Dodge v Snell or Goode v Angland 
be	appealed,	the	determination	of	the	Court	of	Appeal	to	first	hear	the	matter,	
unless believed to be ‘plainly wrong’, will, apply in all jurisdictions that have 
adopted the uniform national legislation, at least until the High Court itself 
decides the correct interpretation.61 
In Farah,62 Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ held: 
Intermediate appellate courts and trial judges in Australia should 
not depart from decisions in intermediate appellate courts in another 
jurisdiction on the interpretation of Commonwealth legislation or 
uniform national legislation unless they are convinced that the 
interpretation is plainly wrong.63
It is worth noting that despite the clarity of the Court’s ruling in Farah, the 
rationale is not without criticism. Justice Rares, writing extrajudicially stated that, 
‘It	 is	 the	High	Court’s	role	 to	resolve	conflicts	which	may	arise	between	the	
different	courts	properly	exercising	their	judicial	functions.	That	role	should	not	
be exercised simply by prescribing a default position that once one Australian 
intermediate appellate court has pronounced upon the position, its decision is, 
in a de facto sense, binding unless the subsequent court is convinced it is plainly 
wrong.’	According	 his	 Honour,	 ‘the	 proper	 approach	 is	 to	 permit	 different	
appellate courts to be free to arrive at their own decisions, although mindful 
and respectful of the persuasiveness of the reasoning of the earlier courts’ 
decision.’64
60 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 23 October 2002, 5765 (Bob Carr, Premier 
and Minister for the Arts).
61 Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say Dee Pty Ltd	(2007)	230	CLR	89,	151–2	[135]	(Gleeson	CJ,	Gummow,	
Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ) (‘Farah’).
62	 (2007)	230	CLR	89.
63 Ibid 151–2 [135].
64 Justice Steven Rares, ‘The Role of the Intermediate Appellate Court after Farah Constructions’ (Speech 
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Where the decision of an earlier Court of Appeal is not followed, the latter 
court is obliged to justify its determination on the basis of a plain error. In CAL 
No 14 Pty Ltd v Motor Accidents Insurance Board,65 the question was whether 
a proprietor or licensee of a hotel in Tasmania owed a duty to take reasonable 
care to prevent an intoxicated patron from riding a motorcycle as he left the 
hotel. The New South Wales Court of Appeal, in a case involving similar facts, 
had held that there could be no such duty except in exceptional circumstances.66
Justices Gummow, Heydon and Crennan said, in a passage with which French 
CJ and Hayne J expressly agreed:
In contrast, the Full Court [of the Supreme Court of Tasmania] 
majority did not say whether it thought the decision of the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal in Cole’s case was plainly wrong, 
but it did not follow it. It distinguished it. This was a legitimate 
course to take, and consistent with the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal’s approach, if the Full Court majority regarded the present 
case as ‘exceptional’. ... The Full Court majority did not in terms 
describe the case as exceptional. Unless the Full Court majority 
had concluded, giving reasons, either that the present case was 
exceptional, or that the New South Wales Court of Appeal was 
plainly wrong, it was its duty to follow the New South Wales Court 
of Appeal. The Full Court majority did not conclude that the present 
case was exceptional or that the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
was plainly wrong. Hence it did not carry out its duty to follow 
the New South Wales Court of Appeal. If these appeals had not 
been brought, there would have been an undesirable disconformity 
between the view of the New South Wales Court of Appeal as to the 
common law of Australia and the view of the Tasmanian Full Court 
majority. At best the Full Court decision would have generated 
confusion. At worst it would have encouraged the commencement 
of baseless and ultimately doomed litigation, to the detriment both 
of	the	unsuccessful	plaintiffs	and	of	the	wrongly	vexed	defendants.67 
delivered at the 4th Appellate Judges Conference of the Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration, 
Melbourne, 7 November 2008) [31]–[32] (emphasis in original).
65	 (2009)	239	CLR	390.
66 Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 113.
67	 CAL	No	14	Pty	Ltd	v	Motor	Accidents	Insurance	Board	(2009)	239	CLR	390,	412–13	[51].
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Conclusion
The	essence	of	the	difference	between	the	two	decisions	lies	in	the	emphasis	
given to the wording ‘recreational activity’ in Dodge v Snell and ‘any sport’ in 
Goode v Angland. 
As noted above, Wood J considered that 
[t]he	 word	 ‘recreational’	 is	 over-arching	 in	 its	 effect	 …	 The	
provision conveys a wide reach extending to any sport and, indeed, 
any other activity providing it is for enjoyment, relaxation or 
leisure. However, it is a given requirement that the activity must be 
‘recreational’ and the provision is designed to assist with the breadth 
of activities that are captured by the phrase.68
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 according	 to	Harrison	 J,	 ‘[t]he	 definition	 of	 recreational	
activity in a way that includes “any sport” leaves no room for an argument’.69
The	 approaches	 taken	 in	 each	 case	 are	 not	 without	 authority.	 A	 definition	
which includes ‘any sport’ may include professional sport, however, under 
conventions	of	statutory	interpretation	a	word	to	be	defined	may	also	retain	its	
ordinary meaning. While the rulings in Dodge v Snell and Goode v Angland 
are mutually unsustainable, each is nonetheless, not without cogent argument. 
Resolution would seem to rest upon appeal to a higher authority. As it stands, 
there is no certainty in an area of law of no small social and legal import.
68 Dodge v Snell [2011]	TASSC	19,	[266].
69 Goode v Angland [2016] NSWSC 1014, [144].
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IN DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIAN SPORT: 
AN OVERVIEW OF STRATEGIES TO 
COMBAT MATCH-FIXING
Genevieve Lim*
Match-fixing in sport is an escalating issue across the globe. 
Australian sports and governments have pro-actively sought to 
combat match-fixing by developing disciplinary policies, criminal 
laws and gambling regulation, implementing appropriate education 
for participants and creating specialist sports integrity units.
This article surveys the major steps taken by law makers and the 
larger Australian sporting organisations. While these measures 
constitute a positive move, deficiencies in their formulation and 
application affect Australia’s protection against match-fixing. 
Deficiencies include a lack of uniformity in their application across 
different Australian jurisdictions and substantive problems within 
disciplinary policies and laws.
Strengthening Australian measures against match-fixing, particularly 
by improving consistency across jurisdictions and sports, would be 
beneficial. Providing greater resources to law enforcement agencies 
to investigate match-fixing and potentially creating an additional 
over-arching agency would also assist Australia to address and 
deflect match-fixing activity. Greater international engagement by 
government, and improved sporting governance and player welfare 
would also support these aims. Finally, investigation of the cultural 
factors influencing sports betting and the unique features of fixing 
as they relate to individual sports may help agencies modify their 




* Genevieve	 Lim,	 BA(Hons)/LLB	 GDLP	 LLM	 (University	 of	 Melbourne),	 Legislation	 Officer,	 Victorian
Government.
1	 Hill	 first	 warned	Australia	 at	 the	ANZSLA	 Conference	 in	 2009.	 ‘Australia	 a	 Target	 for	 Match-Fixing’,	
Australian Leisure Management	 (online),	 9	 October	 2009	 <https://www.ausleisure.com.au/news/australia-a-
target-for-match-fixing>.
